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The Eighth Amendment's Proscription Against
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Requires a
Categorical Rejection of the Death Penalty as
Imposed on Juvenile Offenders Under the Age of
Eighteen: Roper v. Simmons
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EIGHTH AMENDMENT AMENDMENT - SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT -

FOURTEENTH

The Supreme

Court of the United States held that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit the execution of individuals who were under
eighteen years of age at the time of their capital crimes.
Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (2005).
At the age of seventeen, Christopher Simmons coldheartedly
planned with two friends, fifteen-year-old Charles Benjamin and
sixteen-year-old John Tessmer, to burglarize a home and to commit murder.1 Prior to the commission of the crime, Simmons repeatedly told his friends that "he wanted to murder someone." 2 He
further suggested that because they were juveniles, they could
effectively "get away with it."3 According to Simmons' plan, the
three boys met one night at approximately 2:00 a.m.4 Simmons
and Benjamin broke into the home of Shirley Crook, the victim, by
reaching in through a cracked window and unlocking the back
door.' Mrs. Crook awakened, but remained in her bedroom where
the two boys confronted her.6 They forced her from her bed to the
floor, and Simmons used duct tape to cover her eyes and mouth
and to tie her hands together.7 Simmons and Benjamin then ab1. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1187 (2005).
2. Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1187. On more than one occasion, Simmons detailed the manner in which the crime would be committed: first, find someone to burglarize, then tie the
victim up, and finally push the victim off a bridge. State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 170
(Mo. 1997).
3. Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1187.
4. Id. John Tessmer left before the other two boys carried out the murder plan and
avoided prosecution. Id. The State initially charged Tessmer with conspiracy, but abandoned the charge when he agreed to testify against Simmons. Id.
5. Id. at 1187-88.
6. Id. at 1188.
7. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d at 170.
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ducted Mrs. Crook, driving her to a state park in her own minivan.8

After parking the minivan, the boys removed Mrs. Crook, secured the bindings, placed a towel over her head, and walked her
to a railroad trestle located above the Meramec River.9 They hogtied her hands and feet with electrical wire and wrapped her entire face in duct tape before pushing her from the trestle." Mrs.
Crook was alive prior to being pushed from the bridge; she
drowned in the waters below."
Mrs. Crook's husband reported his wife missing on the same day
that two fishermen discovered her body floating in the Meramec
River. 2 Following the crime, Simmons had reportedly bragged to
friends that he had killed a woman "because the bitch seen my
face."" The police learned of Simmons' involvement, promptly arrested him, and properly read him Miranda warnings. 4 After
waiving his right to an attorney, Simmons submitted to interrogation and confessed to the murder.'5 The county prosecutor charged
Simmons with murder in the first degree, burglary, kidnapping,
and stealing. 6 Simmons was tried as an adult and convicted of
first-degree murder. 7 The State sought capital punishment."8 At

8. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1188.
9. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d at 170. The boys had stolen Mrs. Crook's purse and used its
strap, her bathrobe belt, and electrical wire found on the trestle to secure her hands and
feet. Id. They later tossed the purse into the woods. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. The medical examiner ruled drowning as the cause of death and found that
Mrs. Crook remained "alive and conscious" at the time she was thrown from the trestle. Id.
The examiner also found other injuries unrelated to her fall, including "several fractured
ribs and considerable bruising." Id.
12. Id. The two fishermen notified the proper authorities who then recovered Mrs.
Crook's body from the river. Id.
13. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1188. Simmons recognized Mrs. Crook from a previous automobile accident involving them both, and she apparently recognized him as well. Simmons,
944 S.W.2d at 170.
14. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1188. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 437 (1966) (requiring that proper Mirandawarnings be given prior to any custodial interrogation).
15. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1188. Simmons acquiesced to reenact the crime on videotape.
Id. At the trial, the State's evidence against Simmons included the videotaped reenactment
along with testimony of Simmons' pre- and post-crime discussions with friends. Id.
16. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d at 170. For the purposes of trial, the trial court "severed" the
charges of burglary, kidnapping, and stealing. Id.
17. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1188. Simmons could not be tried within the Missouri juvenile
court system because he was seventeen. Id. (citing Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 211.021, 211.031
(2000 & Supp. 2003)).
18. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1188.
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the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial, Simmons received
the death penalty. 9

Simmons then retained new counsel, who filed a motion in the
trial court to set aside Simmons' conviction and death sentence by
reason of ineffective assistance of counsel."0 The trial court found
no constitutional violation and denied the motion for postconviction relief. 1 Simmons' counsel followed with a consolidated
appeal from Simmons' conviction, sentence, and denial of postconviction relief.22 The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed each of
the lower courts' decisions. 3 Simmons' petition to the federal
courts for a writ of habeas corpus also proved unsuccessful.24
The Simmons case appeared to be moribund until the United
States Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia,25 which held
that the execution of a mentally retarded person violated the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.26 Simmons' attorney petitioned again for state post-conviction relief arguing that the
Court's "reasoning of Atkins established that the Constitution
prohibits the execution of a juvenile who was under [eighteen] at
the time the crime was committed." 7 The Missouri Supreme
Court not only granted the petition but also found the reasoning
convincing and set aside Simmons' death sentence. 8 Simmons
was re-sentenced to "life imprisonment without eligibility for pro-

19. Id. at 1189. Despite Simmons' age at the time of the crime, the jury determined
that the *aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors and recommended a sentence of death, which the trial judge accepted. Id. at 1188-89.
20. Id. at 1189.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1189. When the proceedings involve a charge of capital murder or murder in
the first degree, notices of appeal must be filed in the Supreme Court of Missouri. MO.
ANN. STAT. § 565.001 (2005).
23. Roper, 125 S.Ct, at 1189.
24. Id.
25. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
26. Roper, 125 S.Ct at 1189.
27. Id.
28. Id. The Missouri Supreme Court reasoned that since the United States Supreme
Court decided Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989),
a national consensus has developed against the execution of juvenile offenders,
as demonstrated by the fact that eighteen states now bar such executions for
juveniles, that twelve other states bar executions altogether, that no state has
lowered its age of execution below [eighteen] since Stanford, that five states
have legislatively or by case law raised or established the minimum age at
[eighteen], and that the imposition of the juvenile death penalty has become
truly unusual over the last decade.
Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1189 (quoting State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399
(2003) (en banc)).
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bation, parole or release except by act of the Governor."2 9 The
State appealed, filing a petition for a writ of certiorari. °
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the execution of a juvenile offender who was older
than fifteen but younger than eighteen when he committed a capital crime violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States." Justice Kennedy, writing for
the majority, poignantly remarked that the Court addressed this
very question a mere decade and a half ago.32 In Stanford v. Kentucky,33 a divided Court held that the Constitution did not proscribe the death penalty for juvenile offenders in the aforementioned age category.34 A majority considered the objective indicia
insufficient to conclude that the execution of a juvenile falls under
the category of "cruel and unusual punishments" as prohibited by
the Eighth Amendment.35 The Stanford opinion purportedly followed the conscience of the nation, a determination that was opposed by four dissenting Justices. 6 The death penalty was upheld
for juvenile offenders over fifteen but under eighteen.
29. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1189 (quoting Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 413).
30. Brief for Petitioner at 1, Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2004) (No. 03-633).
31. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1187. The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution states that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." Id. at 1190 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VIII). Through the doctrine of selective incorporation, the United States Supreme Court has made the command
of the Eighth Amendment one of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable to
the states by virtue of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962). The relevant part of the Fourteenth Amendment
states: "[Nior shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
32. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1187. The Roper majority included Justices Stevens, Kennedy,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
and Thomas dissented. Id.
33. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
34. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1191 (citing Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370). Prior to the decision in
Stanford, the Court determined that "our standards of decency do not permit the execution
of any offender under the age of sixteen at the time of the crime." Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1190
(citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 818-38 (1988)).
35. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1191. Referencing contemporary standards of decency, the
Court found that of the thirty-seven death penalty states, twenty-two allowed the death
penalty for sixteen-year-old juvenile offenders, and twenty-five allowed it for seventeenyear-old offenders. Id. (citing Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370-71).
36. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1191. Thirty-seven states had enacted laws that permitted
capital punishment. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370-71. The necessary degree of national consensus could not be readily inferred because fifteen of those states declined to impose it
upon sixteen-year-old offenders and twelve declined to impose it upon seventeen-year-old
offenders. Id.
37. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1191. Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Stanford
Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Kennedy joined. Stan-
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A plurality in Stanford abandoned the notion that the Court's
own judgment should have any bearing on the question of the
death penalty for juvenile offenders.3 8 In the Atkins decision, however, the Court returned to its pre-Stanford principle of relying in
part on its own judgment when assessing the gravity of the Eighth
Amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual punishments." 9 Accordingly, two major considerations - an evolving national consensus
and the Court's independent judgment - formed the basis of the
Court's reasoning in the instant case.4"
To interpret the broad language of the Eighth Amendment outlawing "cruel and unusual punishments," the Court necessarily
looked beyond the text itself while working within the parameters
of constitutional design.41 Guidance was derived from sources providing a historical perspective, a view of tradition, and stare decisis.4" The designation of certain punishments as "cruel and unusual" has become a reflection of "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."4" Relying on
objective indicia since Stanford was decided, the Roper Court
found a national consensus against the death penalty for juvenile
offenders."
Justice Kennedy analogized the methodology employed in assessing the pulse of the nation to that used in Atkins.45
The statistics gathered and analyzed were as follows:" Thirty
states proscribe the death penalty for juvenile offenders. 7 Of
those, twelve wholly oppose the death penalty, and eighteen reject
ford, 492 U.S. at 363. Justice O'Connor joined in part, concurred in part, and concurred in
the judgment. Id. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Marshall,
Blackman, and Stevens joined. Id.
38. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1191. While Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment, she
also criticized the plurality's refusal "to judge whether the nexus between the punishment
imposed and the defendant's blameworthiness is proportional." Id. (quoting Stanford, 492
U.S. at 382).
39. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1191-92.
40. Id. at 1192-98.
41. Id. at 1190. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
42. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1190.
43. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
44. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192. A juvenile offender herein refers to minors between the
ages of fifteen and eighteen. Id.
45. Id. Similar to the Atkins case, the Court calculated national statistics that supported the finding of a consensus. Id. In Atkins the Court found the existence of a national
consensus against sentencing the mentally retarded to death. Id. (citing Atkins, 536 U.S.
at 313-16).
46. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192. See Appendix A to the Opinion of the Court, which lists
the states under the following subtitles: I. States That Permit The Imposition of The Death
Penalty on Juveniles; II. States That Retain The Death Penalty But Set the Minimum Age
at 18; and III. States Without The Death Penalty. Id. at 1200-01.
47. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192.
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its imposition for juveniles.48 The remaining twenty states have
no formal ban on the execution of juveniles, but such executions
rarely occur in practice." Since the 1989 decision in Stanford, six
states have executed capital offenders who were juveniles at the
time of the crime. 50 During the last ten years, only three states
have executed similarly situated juveniles.5 Moreover, after Stanford, five additional states abolished the death penalty for juvenile
offenders, four through legislative means and one through judicial
disposition.52 And not one state that abandoned the death penalty
for juveniles has elected to re-impose it since the Stanford decision.53 While these statistics do not reveal change as substantial
as in the Atkins analysis, the numbers are significant enough to
demonstrate a similar "consistency in the direction of change." 4
This finding is even more dramatic when considered in the context
of stricter anti-crime legislation in general, and a trend toward the
harsher punishment of juvenile crime in particular.55 Because a
majority of states have rejected the death penalty for offenders
between ages fifteen and eighteen, the Court concluded that the
Eighth Amendment now mandates the same."
Due to its severity, a punishment of death demands that it be
imposed for the most heinous of crimes and upon the most culpable offenders.5 7 In the Court's judgment, juveniles under eighteen
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. Those three states were Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia. Id.
52. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1193. See VICTOR L. STREIB, THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY
TODAY: DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS FOR JUVENILE CRIMES, JANUARY 1, 1973 DECEMBER 31, 2004, No. 76, (2005),
http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/documents/JuvDeathDec2004.pdf. Id. The Washington Supreme Court raised the age of eligibility to eighteen in State v. Furman, 858 P.2d
1092 (Wash. 1993) (en banc). STREIB at 5. The following states passed laws raising the age
of eligibility to eighteen: Montana (1999), Indiana (2002), South Dakota (2004), and Wyoming (2004). Id. at 7.
53. Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1193.
54. Id. The slower pace of change related to the abandonment of juvenile executions
compared to executions of the mentally retarded was attributed to an earlier recognition of
the death penalty as a disproportionate punishment for juveniles. Id. When the Stanford
case was heard, twelve states had already banned executions under the age of eighteen,
and another fifteen states banned executions under the age of seventeen. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1194 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319). This principle is put into practice during the penalty phase of a capital trial. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1194. States must provide only
specifically outlined aggravating factors. Id. These narrowly defined factors are weighed
against a much broader range of mitigating factors (of which youth is one) so that, if deserving, the defendant's life will be spared. Id.
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do not comfortably fit into the category of "the worst offenders." 8
Justice Kennedy discussed three general differences that set juveniles apart from adults.59 First, juveniles are more often immature
and irresponsible, which can lead to "ill-considered actions and
decisions."6 ° Second, juvenile personalities are more malleable;
juveniles respond readily "to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure."6 And third, a juvenile's character
is less developed than an adult's.6 2 Even if a juvenile commits a
heinous crime, the depravity of the act may not indicate a character incapable of reform." Instead, poor judgment and other inherent character flaws may be a reflection of the youth's unformed
identity and inexperience.64 Such character deficiencies may be
corrected as the youth matures into adulthood.65 For precisely
these reasons, youth is considered a germane mitigating factor in
the sentencing process.66 From a moral perspective, the Court
concluded that it would be unfair to treat the failings of a juvenile
equally as those of an adult. 7
This recognition of a lesser degree of culpability in juveniles
renders the "penological justifications" for the death penalty less
relevant.68 Society's predominant goals for implementing the
death penalty are the dual purposes of "retribution and deterrence."6 9 Retribution may express society's need to exact deserved
punishment or to sufficiently counterbalance the damage caused
to the victim." Either effect becomes disproportionate when the
most severe punishment is imposed on a minor whose culpability
is compromised due to the psychological and physiological imma-

58. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1195.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1195-96.
64. Id. at 1195.
65. Id. at 1196.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1195-96.
68. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1196.
69. Id. In the context of criminal law, retribution is "[p]unishment imposed as repayment or revenge for the offense committed; requital." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1343 (8th
ed. 2004). Deterrence is defined as "[tihe act or process of discouraging certain behavior,
particularly by fear; esp., as a goal of criminal law, the prevention of criminal behavior by
fear of punishment." Id. at 481. Of note, the death penalty also addresses concerns regarding the future dangerousness of a criminal by effectively eliminating the prospect of committing additional crimes. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 n.28 (1976).
70. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1196.
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turity associated with age.71 Furthermore, conclusive evidence is
lacking to suggest that prospective juvenile offenders are deterred
by the threat of capital punishment.7 2 The recklessness and impetuousness of a youth's character suggest that juveniles may be
less inclined to realistically consider the potential repercussions of
criminal acts, however grave they might be.73 Despite the commission of horrific crimes by juveniles, the disproportional effect of
retribution and the inconclusive impact of deterrence 7preclude
4
either as an adequate justification for a sentence of death.
Considering the categorical denial of a rule banning the death
sentence for any juvenile offender under the age of eighteen, Justice Kennedy explained the choice to err on the side of life.75 The
judicial system's reliance on individual assessments, while an entrenched goal in adult jurisprudence, becomes more difficult to
apply to the less culpable youth. 76 Research has shown that even
psychologists struggle to distinguish between a character flawed
by the impulsivity and irresponsibility of youth and one corrupted
by intrinsic and irredeemable depravity.77 Judicial determinations
often involve line drawing, and the Court resolved this issue by
drawing the "death eligibility" line at age eighteen. 8 Speaking for
the majority, Justice Kennedy held that the decision in Stanford v.
Kentucky" no longer controls on this issue. 8°
Finally, the Court confirmed the impropriety of juvenile executions by taking into consideration the views of the international

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. Evidence existed that Simmons did consider potential punishment as he contemplated the crime because he assured his friends that they could "get away with it." See
id. at 1187. However, as Justice Kennedy opined, "the punishment of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction, in particular for a young person."
Id. at 1196. A life sentence cannot be construed as "get[ting] away with it." Id.
74. Id. at 1196.
75. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1197.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1197. See Steinberg, Laurence & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty By Reason of
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death
Penalty, 58 Am. Psychologist 1009, 1014-16 (2003).
78. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1197-98. Drawing the line at age eighteen concurs with the
general recognition of "the comparative immaturity and irresponsibility of juveniles." Id. at
1195. Most states prohibit those under age eighteen "from voting, serving on juries, or
marrying without parental consent." See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1202-04 (Appendices B-D).
79. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
80. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198. Justice Kennedy wrote that "the Stanford Court should
have considered those [s]tates that had abandoned the death penalty altogether," demonstrating its impropriety for all capital offenders, including juveniles. Id.
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community.8 Prior to this decision, the United States stood alone
in the world as the only country to officially sanction the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders.82 Justice Kennedy
carefully noted that proper judicial construction of the Eighth
Amendment "remains our responsibility," yet provided numerous
examples of cases in which some reference was made to the import
of international opinion. 3 He also acknowledged that every country, except the United States and Somalia, ratified Article 37 of
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which
emphatically prohibits capital punishment for crimes committed
by juveniles under eighteen.84 Most foreign nations have either
abandoned or publicly disavowed the practice.8 5 The international
community has regarded the death penalty as a disproportionate
punishment when balanced against the diminished culpability of
youth.8 6 This recognition, while not controlling, buttressed the
outcome of the Court's holding. 7 In concluding the majority opinion, the Court ruled that the imposition of the death penalty on
offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes
were committed violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.8 8
Justice Stevens authored a brief concurring opinion in which
Justice Ginsburg joined.8 9 Justice Stevens reaffirmed the position
that the Court's understanding of the Constitution may necessarily change over time, requiring a newly informed interpretation.9 "
If, in its construction of the Eighth Amendment, the Court denied
the importance of deferring to "the evolving standards of decency,"

81. Id.
82. Id. at 1198.
83. Id. at 1198-99. For example, in the Atkins case, the court recognized that "within
the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally
retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved." Id. (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317
n.21).
84. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1199 (citing United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art. 37, Sept. 2, 1990, 28 I.L.M. 1448).
85. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1199.
86. Id. at 1200. Justice Kennedy emphasized that acknowledging an affirmation of
fundamental rights around the world underscores rather than compromises our loyalty to
the Constitution and the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of freedom. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1205 (Stevens, J., concurring).
90. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1205 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens indicated the
existence of continuing debate regarding the evolutionary process on which modern judicial
interpretations might be based. Id.
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common law principles in existence at the time of the Bill of
Rights might control.9 ' Thus, the execution of a seven-year-old
could be permissible, 92an outcome obviously offensive to our modern sense of morality.
Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion in which she rejected
the categorical denial of the death penalty as a punishment for
any juvenile under the age of eighteen, "no matter how deliberate,
wanton, or cruel the offense."93 She found neither the existence of
a contemporary national consensus nor the Court's reliance on
ruling.9 4
moral proportionality grounds sufficient to justify the
She argued that the objective evidence failed to conclusively demonstrate a significant change in thinking since Stanford v. Kentucky.95 Instead, the Court's own judgment, to which she did not
subscribe, formed the basis of the ruling.96 Justice O'Connor
agreed that the Court's own judgment must be regarded in weighing the severity of the punishment against the magnitude of the
crime and the individual's culpability, but she objected to the notion that minors are "incapable of the moral culpability" necessary
to justify the proportionality of capital punishment.9 7
Justice O'Connor distinguished the rationale in the Atkins
case.9" In Atkins, the evidentiary support provided a clearer basis
than in the instant case to conclude tentatively that a national
consensus had developed against the practice of capital punishment for the mentally retarded.99 In her opinion, the states have
not similarly exhibited a consistent trend toward the abolition of
the juvenile death penalty.'00 Further, she asserted that even
more compelling was the Atkins Court's reliance on its moral

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1206 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
95. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1206 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In tracing her conclusions as
the Court addressed similar issues over the years, Justice O'Connor has steadfastly maintained the need for greater evidentiary support of a national consensus. Id. at 1207-08.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1207-08.
98. Id. at 1208.
99. Id. Justice O'Connor indicated that thirty states had barred the death penalty for
the mentally retarded by the time Atkins was heard. Id. (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 31416).
100. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1211 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor found it
insignificant that since Stanford, only four states that previously permitted juvenile executions passed legislation in opposition to the same, and one additional state reversed course
by judicial determination. Id. at 1211.
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judgment. 1 ' Unlike juveniles under age eighteen, the mentally
retarded, by definition, have diminished intellectual capacities.'
As a result, Justice O'Connor noted that mental deficiencies preclude attaching sufficient blameworthiness in order to justify the
In contrast, she found the
imposition of the death penalty.'
Court's moral proportionality reasoning for juvenile offenders to
be flawed for two reasons."' First, the pertinent distinctions outlined by the Court between minors and adults "appear to be a
matter of degree, rather than kind."0 5 Second, the Court presumed "differences in the aggregate between juveniles and
adults."' 6 The alleged differences may be invalid attacks on culpability when comparing individuals, particularly with regard to
seventeen-year-olds like Simmons." 7
Finding no national consensus and little validity in the Court's
reasoning based on its own moral judgment, Justice O'Connor
found no reason to conclude that international opinion guided the
The existence of an international consensus did
Court's holding.'
not convince her that the Eighth Amendment categorically forbade
capital punishment of juveniles under age eighteen.0 9 She did,
however, disagree with Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion that
international law cannot be considered in our own nation's jurisprudence."' In her conclusion, Justice O'Connor deferred to the
judgments of the nation's democratically elected legislatures to
provide our country with a more definitive answer to this complicated constitutional issue."'
101. Id. at 1209. See also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-21.
102. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1214 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 1214. The diminished culpability of the mentally retarded also challenges the
desired effects of retribution and deterrence. Id.
104. Id. at 1212-13.
105. Id. at 1213.
106. Id.
107. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1213-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 1215.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1215. Justice O'Connor indicated that our "evolving understanding" of the
Eighth Amendment "certainly is neither wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds with,
the values prevailing in other countries." Id. at 1215-16. The principle that forms of punishment should not obliterate fundamental human rights resonates around the world. Id.
at 1216.
111. Id. at 1217. Of note, Justice O'Connor also took issue with the Supreme Court of
Missouri's rejection of the United States Supreme Court's "controlling decision" in Stanford. Id. at 1209. She emphasized that it was "the prerogative of this Court alone to overrule one of its precedents." Id. Moreover, she argued that tacit acceptance of the Missouri
Court's errant jurisprudence might expose the Court's Eighth Amendment precedents to
similar challenges. Id. at 1209-10.
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Justice Scalia penned a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined."2 He began his dissent
by expressing outrage that the Court has essentially "proclaim[ed]
itself sole arbiter of our Nation's moral standards.""' Further,
assuming this monumental role, the Court inappropriately "purport[ed] to take guidance from the views of foreign courts and legislatures."
Justice Scalia disagreed with the Court's search for a modern
construction of the Eighth Amendment, particularly one that
demonstrated a national consensus where he found none." 5 His
calculation of objective indicia indicated that forty-seven percent
of states that permitted capital punishment of juvenile offenders
have now legislated against it, and four states since Stanford have
adopted prohibitive legislation."' Justice Scalia also questioned
the relevancy of the Court's suggestion to include the indicia that
twelve states totally forbid capital executions." 7 Instead, he countered with perhaps the pertinent statistic that each of those states
does try as adults sixteen and seventeen-year-old offenders who
commit non-capital crimes."8 Historically, evidence has shown
that legislative support for any form of capital punishment has
"surged and ebbed."19 Justice Scalia therefore noted that even
states that have not recently executed a juvenile offender might
not abhor the possibility of doing so as circumstances in a future
case may warrant. 2 ° He found that the number of offenders under
eighteen who have been executed has either remained about the

112. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1217 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. Id. Justice Scalia rejected the proposition that the Court's role as "moral arbiter"
had been established in decisions prior to Stanford. Id. at 1221. He suggested that the
"supposed rule" reflected dicta, not a holding, and had "no foundation in law or logic." Id.
at 1222.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1217-20. Justice Scalia also disapproved of the Court's affirmation of the
lower court's decision without reproach. Id. at 1229. He instructed, as did Justice
O'Connor, that the privilege to overrule a United States Supreme Court precedent belongs
to this Court alone. Id. A lower court must be discouraged from reinterpreting the Eighth
Amendment based on its assessments of contemporary values. Id. at 1230. Otherwise, the
predictability and reliability of dependable case law may become vulnerable to "arbitrariness [crowned] with chaos." Id.
116. Id. at 1218. Justice Scalia urged, "Words have no meaning if the view of less than
50% of death penalty States can constitute a national consensus." Id.
117. Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1219 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1220. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 854-55 (1988), in which a
detailed explanation by Justice O'Connor lends support to this proposition.
120. Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1220-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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same or increased to some extent since the Stanford decision. 121
He concluded that none of these statistics supported the Court's
decision that sentencing a juvenile to death contradicts modern
"standards of decency." 122 In choosing to construe "cruel and un-

usual punishments" based on society's "evolving standards of decency," Justice Scalia emphasized that the Court must evaluate
the moral consensus of the country and not impose its own sensibilities.123
Justice Scalia disputed the Court's finding, based on its own
judgment, that juvenile capital offenders cannot be as morally
culpable as adults. 24 Selective reliance on particular psychological
studies conveniently supported the Court's point of view. 2' Having said that, Justice Scalia contended that what these studies
demonstrated was that not in all cases, but "in most cases," juveniles under age eighteen are less able to assume "moral responsibility" for their actions.'26 He emphasized that murder is not just
dangerous, unsociable behavior, and that juveniles, like Simmons,
who commit premeditated murder can be "just as culpable as
adults."'27 Justice Scalia also found no evidentiary support to substantiate the Court's contention that the goals of retribution and
deterrence cannot be accomplished by imposing the death penalty
on juvenile offenders.'28 That conclusion merely followed from
"false generalization that youth
what he described as the Court's
12
always defeats culpability."

That the Court gave credence to the views of the international
community concerned Justice Scalia. 3 ° The United States' refusal
to ratify international treaties banning capital punishment for
individuals under age eighteen implied one of two things: either a
121. Id. at 1221.
122. Id. at 1218-22.
123. Id. at 1217, 1222. Justice Scalia adhered to fundamental notions of a democratic
society where "legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people." Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 17576 (1976)).
124. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1221-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 1223.
126. Id.
127. Id. Justice Scalia addressed the consideration of age as a mitigating factor in the
sentencing of capital offenses. Id. at 1224-25. He disagreed with the Court's presumption
that juries are ill equipped to weigh a defendant's youth along with the other aggravating
and mitigating factors of the crime. Id. Such a conclusion inevitably frustrates the structure of our capital sentencing jurisprudence, challenging the efficacy of our juries. Id.
128. Id. at 1225.
129. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1225 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 1225-29.
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true national consensus has not yet been reached or one has been
131
reached which is contrary to the holding in the instant case.
More importantly, he rejected the proposition that our principles
32
of jurisprudence should "conform" to that of any other country.
Justice Scalia cited several examples of laws in other countries
He suggested that the
that diverged markedly from our own.'
majority invoked foreign law when in harmony with its own opinions and ignored it otherwise.14 In sum, Justice Scalia scorned the
Court's reliance on international opinion to affirm its contemporary35interpretation of capital sentencing jurisprudence in America.'
Interestingly, the constitutional phrase at issue, "cruel and unusual punishments," was derived from the English Declaration of
Rights of 1688, representing a principle of law dating back to the
The underlying concept embodied in our Eighth
Magna Carta.'
Amendment certainly reflects "nothing less than the dignity of
man."' 3' Yet the precise standard for detailing the scope of the
Amendment has been dynamic rather than static, "acquir[ing]
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." 8 Punishments involving barbarism and torture have long
been deemed "cruel and unusual" as have excessive punishments,
which either by length or severity proved disproportionate to the
offenses as charged.13 9 Because the death penalty has generally
not been forbidden by the Eighth Amendment, the law has attempted to create a system of capital punishment that is "consis131. Id. at 1226. Justice Scalia referred to two treaties: the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 6(5), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar.
23, 1976) and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art.
37, Sept. 2, 1990, 28 I.L.M. 1448). See generally Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1194, 1199 (majority
opinion).
132. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1225-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 1226-28. According to Justice Scalia, laws of most other countries that differ
significantly from American jurisprudence include the following: a constitutional right to
trial by jury and grand jury indictment, the Court-pronounced (evidence) exclusionary rule,
the degree of separation between church and state, and the allowance of abortion on demand until the point of viability. Id.
134. Id. at 1228.
135. Id. at 1229.
136. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). The model provision stated, "[E]xcessive
Bail ought not to be required nor excessive Fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual Punishments inflicted." Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1199. The Magna Carta "isgenerally regarded as one
of the great common-law documents and as the foundation of constitutional liberties."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 971 (8th ed. 2000).
137. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100.
138. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
139. Weems, 217 U.S. at 370-71.
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tent and principled" as well as "humane" and sensitive to individual characteristics.14 ° Factors mitigating an offender's culpability,
like youth, have been determined to be relevant according to "the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.""'
Historical evidence has revealed that, at common law, the rebuttable presumption of incapacity to commit any felony was set
at the age of fourteen, and capital punishment could theoretically
be imposed at the age of seven. 2 Age limitations relative to the
ultimate penalty of death have been largely dependent upon
statutory legislation, which has required a weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and after careful consideration,
a "recommendation of mercy" by sentencing juries.1 ' Then in
1988, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Thompson v. Oklahoma... to consider whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the execution of a defendant convicted of firstdegree murder for an offense committed when he was fifteen years
of age.4 The Thompson Court's analysis involved an evaluation of
relevant legislative enactments and jury decisions. 4 6 These determinants of "contemporary standards of decency" confirmed the
Court's judgment that a minor under the age of sixteen is incapable of acting with the necessary degree of culpability to justify a
penalty of death.'47

140. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982). In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978), the Court determined that "[t]he need for treating each defendant in a capital case
with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual is far more important than
in noncapital cases." Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605.
141. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
142. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 864 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The historical evidence referred to was derived from Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of
England, which Justice Scalia noted was "widely accepted during the time the Eighth
Amendment was adopted as an accurate description of the common law." Id. Blackstone
explicitly addressed the age at which juveniles could be subjected to capital punishment.
Id. Accordingly, Justice Scalia suggested "[t]he historical practice in this country conformed with the common-law understanding that 15-year-olds were not categorically immune from commission of capital crimes." Id.
143. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1224 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 197 (1976).
144. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
145. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 818-19.
146. Id. at 822-23.
147. Id. at 824-833. Justice Stevens delivered an opinion for the Court, in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined. Id. at 817. Justice O'Connor concurred in
the judgment, and Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice White joined. Id. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration
or decision of the case. Id.
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Accepting the premise that some criminals are too young to be
executed, the Thompson Court focused on the eighteen states that
had legislatively established a minimum age for the imposition of
the death penalty and found that all of them set the age above fifteen.'
The notion that it would offend civilized standards of decency to execute a person under the age of sixteen coincided with
views of important professional organizations (American Bar Association, American Law Institute), other nations sharing our Anglo-American heritage (United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia),
and leading members of the Western European community (West
Germany, France, Portugal, the Netherlands, Scandinavian countries). "9 Furthermore, juries in the twentieth century rarely imposed the death penalty upon offenders under the age of sixteen;
the last of such executions had occurred in 1948.150 The conclusion
drawn was that the execution of a fifteen-year-old offender had
become "generally abhorrent to the conscience of the community."151
Finally, the Thompson Court relied on its own judgment in determining whether the imposition of the death penalty on such a
minor who committed a heinous murder contributed to the social
purposes of the death penalty, which are retribution and deterrence.' 'The Court has generally agreed that juveniles cannot be
held as morally culpable as adults for the same reasons that they
cannot be trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of adult"'
hood. 53
Their lesser culpability undermined the death penalty as
an appropriate punishment to achieve the purpose of retribu148. Id. at 828-29.
149. Id. at 830-31. Juvenile executions have also been prohibited in the Soviet Union.
Id. Moreover, this was not the first time the views of the international community have
been recognized as relevant to a decision. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 102.
150. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 832. "Infrequent and haphazard" death sentencing contributes to arbitrariness, which has been found to be violative of the Eighth Amendment. See
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), where the Court described the cumulative test to
determine the constitutionality of a punishment as one that is unusually severe, arbitrarily
inflicted, rejected by contemporary society, and serving no greater penal goal than a less
severe punishment. Furman, 408 U.S. at 282. In Furman,certiorari was granted to review
decisions of the Supreme Court of Georgia, affirming imposition of the death penalty on
defendants convicted of murder and rape, and to review a judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, affirming imposition of the death penalty on a defendant convicted of
rape. Id. at 239. The Supreme Court held "that imposition and carrying out of the death
penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 239-40.
151. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 832.
152. Id. at 833-36.
153. Id. at 834. This notion has been evidenced by the consideration of youth as a relevant mitigating factor in capital sentencing jurisprudence. Id.
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tion."' The deterrent effect was also substantially compromised
because of the paltry likelihood that a minor would consider death
as the potential consequence of any criminal activity.'55 Having no
appreciable contribution to the dual purposes of the death penalty,
the Court decided that the execution of a fifteen-year-old proved to
be an unconstitutional punishment, imposing needless "pain and
suffering.""6
The following year the Court revisited the issue of age limitations in Stanford v. Kentucky," 7 this time confronting the issue of
whether a national consensus existed to proscribe the death penalty for juvenile offenders over the age of fifteen but under the age
of eighteen."' Petitioners in a consolidated appeal invoked the
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" to argue that the imposition of capital punishment for
such juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment."9 In Stanford, the
Court again based much of its judgment on objective factors to
determine American conceptions of "cruel and unusual" punishments, and accordingly, acknowledged their respect for state legislative decisions. 6 ° Laws of thirty-seven states permitted capital
punishment, and of those, fifteen rejected the execution of sixteenyear-olds and twelve rejected the execution of seventeen-yearolds."' The Stanford Court remained unconvinced that a national
consensus existed to forbid juvenile executions.'6 2 Also unconvincing was the fact that prosecutors rarely sought and juries rarely

154. Id. at 836-37.
155. Id. at 837.
156. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
157. 492 U.S. at 361 (1989).
158. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 364-65.
159. Id. at 369. The grant of certiorari also involved Wilkins v. Missouri, 492 U.S. 361
(1989). Id. at 366-68. Wilkins, who was sixteen at the time of the crime, pleaded guilty to
the charges of first-degree murder, armed criminal action, and carrying a concealed
weapon. Id. Stanford was seventeen at the time of the crime and was convicted of murder,
first-degree sodomy, first-degree robbery, and receiving stolen property. Id. at 365-66.
160. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369-70 (citing Coker, 433 U.S. at 592; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176).
Justice Scalia noted that the emphasis is on American conceptions of decency, minimizing
the relevancy of the opinions of various amici as well as the practices of other nations.
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370 n.1.
161. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370.
162. Id. at 371. Of interest, the Governor of Kentucky spared the life of Kevin Stanford
in December 2003, emphasizing that "we ought not be executing people who, legally, were
children." Id. (citing Patton Bids Office Farewell, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Kentucky),
Dec. 9, 2003, at B3, available at 2003 WL 65043346). Stanford's sentence was commuted to
life imprisonment without parole. Id.
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imposed the death penalty on juvenile offenders in this age category. 163
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia rejected the petitioners' reliance on "socioscientific evidence" to prove how the diminished
culpability of sixteen and seventeen-year-olds might be interpreted to undermine the retributive and deterrent effects of capital punishment.1'' The plurality opinion also abandoned the application of the Court's "own informed judgment" regarding what
should be and, instead, focused on the identification of what society's moral attitudes actually are.6 ' In conclusion, finding neither
convincing scientific evidence nor a historical or modern societal
consensus, the Stanford Court held that such punishment did not
violate the Eighth Amendment's proscription against "cruel and
unusual punishments."166
The Supreme Court decided another pertinent case, Penry v.
Lynaugh,'6 7 on the same day as Stanford.'
The issue in Penry
was whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of a
mentally retarded defendant. 9 Based on the established principle
that punishment should be directly related to the blameworthiness of the criminal, individual characteristics such as emotional
or mental problems should be considered as mitigating factors.'
Defendant Penry, however, challenged this principle and sought a
categorical prohibition of capital punishment for the mentally retarded, arguing that a national consensus had emerged in support
of the same.' 7' Only two states had enacted legislation forbidding
executions of the mentally retarded, and Penry offered no further
evidence of the general behavior of juries with respect to sentenc-

163. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 373-74. Statistics tending to prove that fewer capital offenders under the age of eighteen than over eighteen have either received the death penalty or
have been executed provide little instruction because of 'the undisputed fact" that juveniles
commit far fewer crimes. Id. at 374. Furthermore, Justice Scalia emphasized that "rarely"
cannot be equated with "never," thus rejecting a categorical denial of the punishment's
unacceptability to prosecutors and juries. Id.
164. Id. at 377-78.
165. Id. at 378. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 23, Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361
(1989) (No. 87-6026), in which the petitioners recommended that the Court rely on its "own
informed judgment."
166. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
167. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
168. Roper, 125 U.S. at 1191.
169. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307.
170. Id. at 317-19 (citing Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604; Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-14).
171. Penry, 492 U.S at 329.
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ing mentally retarded defendants."' The Penry Court held that a
national consensus might someday emerge according to the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society," but that day had not yet come."'
That day arrived thirteen years later when the Court decided
Atkins v. Virginia174 and held that executions of the mentally retarded were "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment. 175 Following the Penry decision, state legislatures began responding to the issue, many enacting legislation
that exempted the mentally retarded from the death penalty.'76
By the time Atkins was decided, the death penalty statutes of
eighteen states excluded the execution of the mentally retarded,
and twelve others had abandoned capital punishment entirely.'77
Furthermore, sentencing juries in states that had not prohibited
the execution of the mentally retarded proved reluctant to impose
the death penalty.'78 Because the practice had become "truly unusual," the Atkins Court held that a national consensus had
emerged against it.' 79
Moreover, the Court returned to a reliance on its independent
moral judgment in concluding that the ultimate penalty of death
was a disproportionate punishment for a mentally retarded criminal. 8' The execution of mentally retarded persons cannot appreciably advance retribution and deterrence, society's dual purposes
for capital punishment. 8 ' The Atkins Court concluded that such
punishment was excessive and that the Eighth Amendment enjoined the states from imposing executions on mentally retarded
offenders. 8 2 By determining a similar "consistency in the direction
of change" regarding contemporary morality, the Roper Court's

172. Id. at 334. Even if the two states with such legislation were added to the fourteen
states that completely forbid capital punishment, a sufficient national consensus did not
exist. Id.
173. Id. at 340 (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 101).
174. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
175. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307, 321.
176. Id. at 314-15.
177. Id. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192, wherein the Court interpreted these same statistics to include a total of thirty states which prohibited the death penalty for the mentally
retarded.
178. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316. Only five states had executed mentally retarded offenders
with a known IQ of seventy or less since Penry was decided. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 318-21.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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abrogation of Stanford proved analogous to the Atkins decision
that overruled Penry.'
In confronting the question of whether the age of a juvenile offender proved a sufficient justification to categorically deny the
state the power to sentence the offender to death, the Roper Court
followed a typical pattern of analysis."8 The first step involved an
attempt to interpret the text of the Eighth Amendment by considering an historical perspective, a view of tradition, and stare decisis."' Then an evaluation of legislative acts and judicial decisions was necessary in order to assess the conscience of the nation.'86 Finally, reliance on the Court's own judgment influenced
whether, in balance, the death penalty could be judged an appropriately proportionate punishment.'8 7
The Roper Court contemplated the text of the Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth, which prohibits the imposition of "cruel and unusual punishments." 8 To
comport with the essence of that admonition, judicial decisions
concerning punishment must continually be mindful of the dignity
of man.8 9 Based on stare decisis, the constitutionality of capital
punishment in general was presumed.19 ° Because tradition and
history cannot offer a timely perspective on the application of the
death penalty to juveniles in the relevant age category, the Court's
inquiry appropriately turned to modern notions of human dignity.191
Societal standards have long guided the Court in the evaluation
of which crimes and which offenders might be deserving of the

183. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1193.
184. The age referred to encompasses offenders between fifteen and eighteen years old.
Id. at 1191.
185. Id. at 1190.
186. Id. at 1192.
187. Id.
188. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
189. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100.
190. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1190-92. This statement can be inferred from the Court's opinion, which traces relevant case history without raising the question of the constitutionality
of the death penalty in general. Compare Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (the
imposition and execution of the death penalty in the murder and rape cases before the
Court did constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). Furman is a compelling case because each justice wrote a separate
opinion, five in support of and four in opposition to the judgment, addressing the constitutionality of the death penalty. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240.
191. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192-94.
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death penalty.19 2 Long ago, in Weems v. United States, the Court
established the principle that Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
inevitably reflects the dynamic standards of civilized society.9 In
its progressive interpretation of the constitutional prohibition
against "cruel and unusual punishments," the Weems Court represented the public's evolving moral attitudes as standards "enlightened by a humane justice."194 Accordingly, the Roper Court's second step of analysis involved the assessment of legislative enactments and jury determinations, two crucial indicators of our nation's enlightened standards of decency."'5 The Roper majority correctly decided that the objective indicia pointed to the rejection of
the death penalty for juveniles between the ages of fifteen and
eighteen.19 s
In their dissenting opinions, both Justice O'Connor and Justice
Scalia analyzed the objective indicia, but each rejected the majority's conclusion.'97 Statistical evidence can be subject to interpretation, and the dissenters obviously interpreted the available evidence differently, finding no support for a national trend or consensus on which to base a bright line rule of law.'98 In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy admitted that the evidence was not
as conclusively persuasive as in Atkins and, therefore, based the
Court's decision on the demonstration of a comparable national
movement toward changing moral attitudes.'9 9 Justice O'Connor
suggested that the Court's own judgment, instead, formed the basis of the ruling.200 In fact, Justice Scalia vehemently disapproved
of the Court's reliance upon its own judgment and characterized
the Court as essentially proclaiming itself the "sole arbiter of our
Nation's moral standards."2 ' Such an attack obscures a long192. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 184. In Gregg, the Court discussed the community's sanction of capital punishment, essentially saying that when a crime is so "grievous
an affront to humanity," causing not only private but public injury, the only adequate punishment may be the penalty of death. Id.
193. Weems, 217 U.S. at 376-78. In 1910, the Court wrote, "Time works changes, brings
into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gives it birth." Id. at 373.
194. Id. at 378.
195. Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1192-93.
196. Id. at 1194.
197. Id. at 1207-08 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), 1218-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined in Justice Scalia's dissent. Id. at 1217
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 1206 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), 1217-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 1193 (majority opinion).
200. Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1206 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 1217 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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standing principle in American jurisprudence that it is the task of
the judiciary to interpret particularly vague language in our Constitution. 202 With regard to interpreting the law of the Eighth
Amendment, the majority followed the principle that the Constitution "contemplates" the role of the Court's judgment as it inevitably bears on the acceptability of a punishment.0 3
Pertinently, the Justices' independent moral judgment played a
key role in both identifying the existence of a national movement
toward a more humane justice and assessing the blameworthiness
of juveniles who commit heinous crimes while under the age of
eighteen."°' Thus, the third step of analysis implicated the Court's
2 5
own judgment in the consideration of a juvenile's culpability.
The Eighth Amendment implicitly requires that a capital penalty
imposed must "be proportional to the harm caused and the defendant's blameworthiness."" 6 Having examined scientific, psychological, and sociological evidence regarding juveniles in the relevant age category, the Roper Court properly concluded that juveniles do not comfortably fit into the category of "the worst offenders." °7 The majority's opinion presumed all juvenile offenders to
be immature, irresponsible, malleable, and lacking the judgment
and ability to carefully evaluate the possible consequences of morally reprehensible conduct.0 ' Because of the distinctive qualities
associated with age, juvenile offenders cannot fairly be held as
sufficiently culpable. 2 °9 The finding of diminished culpability seriously undermines society's "penological justifications" for capital
punishment of retribution and deterrence. 10
Both Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia disagreed with the
lesser degree of blameworthiness that the Court afforded to all
juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen." Again, they argued
202. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833 n.40 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177
(1803)).
203. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1191-92 (citing Coker, 433 U.S. at 597). See also Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), wherein the Court wrote, "Although the judgments of legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is for us ultimately to judge
whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty. . . ." Enmund,
458 U.S. at 797.
204. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1191-98.
205. Id. at 1195.
206. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 823.
207. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1195.
208. Id. at 1195-96.
209. Id. at 1196.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1212-13 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), 1223-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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against mandating this age-related rule to establish an inflexible
sentencing guideline.2 12 Both pointed to Simmons, the defendant,
as a convincing exception to the above generalizations.2 1 1 Christopher Simmons committed premeditated murder at the age of seventeen.214 He planned the murder, conspired with friends, and
even suggested that they could escape punishment because of
their youth.2 15 Justices O'Connor and Scalia found neither psychological studies nor objective evidence compelling enough to establish a categorical denial of capital punishment for Simmons or for
other deliberate murderers like him. 216 Arguably, there is validity
in the dissenters' position that not all juveniles deserve to be
characterized as less culpable.
By drawing a death eligibility line at eighteen, the Court has
removed an element of discretion from the sentencing procedure,
but perhaps it has also introduced a comparative unfairness.2 17
For example, consider a hypothetical where two equally culpable
offenders committed the same crime, but one was age eighteen
and the other only seventeen.21 It would be difficult to justify sentencing the eighteen-year-old to death and sparing the life of the
younger offender merely because he was still a minor.2"9 To avoid
such sentencing injustices, the Court may have alternatively held
that capital offenders who are below the age of eighteen must be
presumed to lack sufficient maturity to be sentenced to death.22 °
This presumption would then "be subject to rebuttal by the State,"
212. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1206 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), 1223 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 1213 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), 1223 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But see Brief for
Respondent, which provides a different perspective on Simmons' character, as follows:
Simmons post-conviction counsel retained an expert clinical psychologist who evaluated
Simmons and suggested that his immaturity, adolescent behaviors, abusive family history,
substance dependence, and a possible personality disorder would play "a very significant
role in his commission of the offense." Brief for Respondent at 8, Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.
Ct. 1183 (2004) (No. 03-633).
214. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1187.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1213-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), 1223-24 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217. Joseph L. Hoffman, On the Perils of Line-Drawing: Juveniles and the Death Penalty, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 229, 243-45 (1989).
218. Id. at 245. This hypothetical is based on one in which Hoffman altered the facts of
areal case. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 271. See also Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Thompson v. Oklahoma,
wherein he contemplated the possibility of a compromise between too much and too little
sentencing discretion by writing, "I might even agree with the plurality's conclusion if the
question were whether a person under [sixteen] when he commits a crime can be deprived
of the benefit of a rebuttable presumption that he is not mature and responsible enough to
be punished as an adult." Thompson, 487 U.S. at 859 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

144

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 44

accommodating the possibility of the death penalty for "the unusually mature" seventeen-year-old murderer.2 21 Such a compromise could also have resolved the argument concerning diminished culpability for some-versus-all juveniles and perhaps satisfied the dissenters.
Recognizing that the Court's holding changes very little in practice may refute such attenuated theoretical arguments as discussed above.22 2 Despite the morally vile, wanton, or cruel acts
committed by juveniles, both the imposition of the death penalty
on minors and actual executions have been rare occurrences.223 In
acknowledgment of this evidence, the Roper Court aptly followed
the decision in Atkins.22 4 The Atkins Court reasoned that since the
practice had become "truly unusual," a national consensus had
unquestionably emerged against it."
Given the Roper Court's
categorical denial of capital punishment for any person under the
age of eighteen, a juvenile offender will certainly escape the punishment of death, but no more. A sentence of life imprisonment
without eligibility for parole remains a constitutionally acceptable
punishment for a murderer like Simmons, whose heinous crime
warrants it and whose future dangerousness demands it.
The Roper Court should be commended for deciding this very
complex and emotional issue on the side of life. In Lockett, Chief
Justice Burger discussed the grave risk of imposing the death
penalty "in spite of factors which may call for a less severe pen-

221. Hoffman, supra note 217, at 271.
222. While the economic effects of the Court's decision are beyond the scope of this discussion, it has long been argued that it costs more to execute a man than to imprison him
for life. Furman, 408 U.S. at 358. See also Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Role
and Consequences of the Death Penalty in American Politics, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC.
CHANGE, 711, 719 (1991) (illustrating cost estimates from the state of Florida as a typical
example "where each death sentence is estimated to cost approximately 3.18 million dollars, compared to a cost of life imprisonment (forty years) of approximately $516,000");
Costs of the Death Penalty and Related Issues: Hearing Before the Standing Committees on
Codes, Judiciary,and Corrections,New York State Assembly (2005) (testimony of Richard
C. Dieter, Executive Director, Death Penalty Information Center) ("The major cost studies
on the death penalty all indicate that it is much more expensive than a system where the
most severe sentence is life in prison").
223. Respondent's Brief at 44, Roper, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (No. 03-633). Herein it was noted,
"In the last 10 years, only three of the 20 states that theoretically permit the execution of
juvenile offenders have actually carried out such executions." Id. Justice Scalia, however,
found the evidence unclear as to whether executions of juveniles under the age of eighteen
have decreased since Stanford was decided. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1221 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
224. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1194 (majority opinion).
225. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
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alty."226 In the instant case, the majority established such factors
and, in effect, agreed with Chief Justice Burger's approach that
"[wihen the choice is between life and death, that risk is unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."2 7 Our civilized society has advanced beyond the primitive notion of a life for a life to a decidedly more
humane justice.228 Despite Justice Scalia's protest to the contrary,
the Court did not depend on the views of the international community to infer such meaning from the text and spirit of our Constitution.229 In the final step of analysis, the validation derived
from international opinion strengthened the majority's resolve to
embrace the dignity of man while exercising the power to punish
within the constitutional limitations formed to establish justice.
Moreover, by eliminating the finality and irrevocability of a sentence of death, the Roper Court's holding offers hope for the redemption and rehabilitation of a juvenile offender.2 °
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226. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605.
227. Id.
228. Coker, 433 U.S. at 620.
229. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1226 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
230. Hoffman, supra note 217, at 284 n.262. Hoffman quoted from a study of the juvenile death penalty, which found that "juvenile murderers tend to be model prisoners and
have a very low rate of recidivism when released." Id. (citing VICTOR L. STREIB, DEATH
PENALTY FOR JUVENILES 25, 37 (1987)).

